Geisler - Clarification on Self-determinism and Cause and Effect

In his book Chosen But Free, Norman Geisler devotes one chapter to answering philosophical objections raised against the concept of "free will". This allows him to clarify what the position of self-determinism is, and how it relates to the concept of cause and effect.

Following are excerpts from the second edition (Bethany House Publishers). It does not seem necessary here to rephrase or restate his words.

Much, if not most, of the problem in discussing "free will" is that the term is defined differently by various persons in the dispute. . . .Logically, there are only three basic views: self-determinism (self-caused actions), determinism (acts caused by another), and indeterminism (acts with no cause whatsoever). Indeterminism is a violation of the law of causality that every event has a cause, and determinism is a violation of free will, since the moral agent is not causing his own actions.

There are, of course, several varieties of self-determinism. Some contend that all moral acts must be free only from all external influence. Others insist they must be free from both external and internal influence, that is, truly neutral. But they all have in common that, whatever influence there may be on the will, the agent could have done otherwise. That is, they could have chosen the opposite course of action. (pages 181-182)

Representatives of moral self-determinism sometimes [mistakenly] speak of free will as though it were the efficient cause of moral actions. This would lead one naturally to ask: What is the cause of the act of free choice, and so? But a more precise description of the process of a free act would avoid this problem. Technically, free will is not the efficient cause of a free act; it is simply the power through which the agent performs the free act. I (my Self) act by means of my will. The efficient cause of a free act is really the free agent, not the free choice. Free choice is simply the power by which the free agent acts. We do not say that person is free choice but simply that he has free choice. Likewise, we do not say man is thought but only that he has the power of thought. So it is not the power of free choice that causes a free act, but the person who has this power.

Now, if the real cause of a free act is not an act but an actor, then it makes no sense to ask for the cause of the actor as though it were another act. The cause of a performance is the performer. Likewise, the cause of a free act is not another free act, and so on. Rather, it is a free agent. And once we have arrived at the free agent, it is meaningless to ask what caused its free acts. For if something else caused its actions, then the agent is not the cause of them and thus is not responsible for them. The free moral agent is the cause of free moral actions. And it is as senseless to ask what caused the free agent to act as it is to ask: Who made God? The answer is the same in both cases: Nothing can cause the firs cause because it is first. There is nothing before the first. Likewise, a person is the first cause of his own moral actions. If he were not the cause of his own free actions, then they would not be his actions. (182-183)

The moral self-determinist does not claim there are any uncaused moral actions. He, in fact, believes all moral actions are caused by moral agents. But unlike the moral determinist who believes all human acts are caused by another (e.g., by God), the self-determinist believes that ultimately there are more selves (agents) than God who cause actions. Either way, the self-determinist believes that there is a cause for every moral action and that the cause is a moral agent, whether it is God or some other moral creature. (183-184)

It is true that no actor (agent) can cause itself to exist, for a cause is ontologically prior to its effect. And one cannot be prior to himself; therefore, a self-cause being (actor) is impossible. However, a self-caused action is not impossible, since the actor (cause) must be prior to its action (effect). So self-caused being is impossible, but self-caused becoming is not. We determine what we will become morally. But God determines what we are ontologically (i.e., in our being). So while man cannot cause his own being, he can cause his own moral behavior.

Perhaps some of the confusion could be cleared away if we did not speak of self-determinism as though one were determining his Self. For moral self-determinism does not refer to the determination of one's Self but determination by one's self. So it would be more proper not to speak of a self-caused action, but of an action caused by one's Self. Yet even without this distinction, there is a significant difference between a self-caused being and a self-caused action. The former is clearly impossible but the latter is not. For a being cannot be prior to itself, but an actor must be prior to his action. (184)