April 2009 Archives

I have been pouring through some television clips from the 2008 presidential campaigns (a sad year in American history) and was rather fascinated by this figure of Cindy McCain, or rather her relationship to the abortion issue. As far as I can tell, she was attempting to be as supportive of her husband as possible but really did not agree with the fundamentals of his position on abortion. Embedded is one clip in which she seems to espouse her husband's pro-life position, but then affirms that she is not opposed to abortion in the case of rape or incest.



Whatever Mrs. McCain's views are on abortion, this seems like a good opportunity to point out the inconsistency of the position: that is, allowing for abortion in the case of rape or incest, but otherwise being against it. There is a conflict of ideology here.

The foundation of the pro-life position is that unborn infants (technically, embryos or fetuses) are human beings, deserving of whatever basic human rights can reasonably be afforded them, including protection from undeserved harm. The corollary of this belief is that aborting such a being is murder.

Consequently, to allow for abortion in the case of rape or incest is to effectively say that that murdering the unborn is acceptable if the circumstances of the abortion are coerced or sufficiently traumatic. But how does two wrongs make a right, in this case? What does the abortion accomplish that exempts us from the responsibility for the killing?

Obviously, the rape or incest has already taken place. No abortion can erase the trauma of that experience. So then, perhaps the abortion is meant to erase that reminder of the trauma, by destroying the child that resulted from it. But if we weigh the child's right to life against the mother's desire to escape her emotions and memories, certainly the life of the child is of more paramount importance, is it not?

Or perhaps the abortion is meant to relieve the mother of the burden of pregnancy, and the difficulties of caring for the infant. Doubtlessly, the new responsibilities are an imposition, forced unfairly on the mother, who may have been unprepared or unwilling to have any children or family. But the criminal here is the rapist, not the child. Some case might be made for the execution of the rapist, but not the execution of the child.

And there are alternatives to abortion. The mother, despite the terrible circumstances of the conception, might come to see the child as a precious gift from God. After all, a beautiful gem is still a gem, even if you find it in the dirt. Or, if that seems too incredible a thought, there is the realistic option that the child might be placed into the hands of a loving relative or adoptive family.

So why try to balance on such a precarious distinction? It seems better to be consistent, and either say that all the unborn - including those conceived from rape and incest - are human beings and deserving of our protection; or affirm with the pro-choice advocates that the unborn is simply a part of the mother's body, which she can do with as she wills.

I found a helpful website containing the works of ancient philosophers, in easy to download form:

http://www.ac-nice.fr/philo/textes/biblio.htm

The site text is in French, but it is readable enough using Google translation:

http://translate.google.com/translate?js=n&prev=_t&hl=en&ie=UTF-8&u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ac-nice.fr%2Fphilo%2Ftextes%2Fbiblio.htm&sl=fr&tl=en&history_state0=

Some of the works available are French translations, but many are available in their original Greek or Latin.

Following is a quotation of a quotation, from page vi of Irving M. Copi's Introduction to Logic, Sixth Edition:

HOW THE ART OF REASONING IS NECESSARY

When one of his audience said, "Convince me that logic is useful," he said,
Would you have me demonstrate it?
"Yes."
Well, then, must I not use a demonstrative argument?
And, when the other agreed, he said, How then shall you know if I impose upon you? And when the man had no answer, he said, You see how you yourself admit that logic is necessary, if without it you are not even able to learn this much--whether it is necessary or not.
--Discourses of Epictetus

"VERBUM DEI MANET IN AETERNUM." This phrase is better known to English speakers as "the Word of God abides forever" or "the Word of God endures forever". It is also part of the insignia of Concordia Publishing House, which published my copy of Dr. Martin Luther's Small Catechism. The exact year of printing is not listed on the book, but the copyright is listed as 1943 and 1971, with minor revisions in 1965.

This catechism provides, in simple terms, an explanation of the Lutheran position on pastoral absolution. The following quotes are from pages 188 to 192.

What is Confession? Confession embraces two parts. One is that we confess our sins; the other, that we receive absolution, or forgiveness, from the pastor as from God Himself, and in no wise doubt, but firmly believe, that by it our sins are forgiven before God in heaven.

284. What is the first part of Confession? The first part of Confession is that we confess, or acknowledge, our sins.

285. What sins should we confess before God? Before God we should plead guilty of all sins, even of those which we do not know, as we do in the Fifth Petition of the Lord's Prayer and in the General Confession.

286. What sins should we confess before the pastor? Before the pastor we should confess those sins only which we know and feel in our hearts.

So from this it would seem that Lutheran's have a dual faceted perspective on forgiveness. We are held responsible to confess our general state of sinfulness to God, but individual, known sins come (more directly) under the ministry of the pastor.

287. What is the second part of Confession? The second part of Confession is that we receive absolution, or the forgiveness of sins.

288. How should we regard the absolution, or forgiveness of sins, pronounced by the pastor? We should regard the absolution as if pronounced by God Himself and in no wise doubt, but firmly believe, that by it our sins are forgiven before God in heaven.

This is doubtlessly a corollary of their belief in the Office of the Keys. From page 18:

What is the Office of the Keys? It is the peculiar church power which Christ has given to His Church on earth to forgive the sins of penitent sinners, but to retain the sins of the impenitent as long as they do not repent.

Where is this written? Thus writes the holy Evangelist John, chapter twentieth: "The Lord Jesus breathed on His disciples and saith unto them, Receive ye the Holy Ghost. Whosesoever sins ye remit, they are remitted unto them; and whosesoever sins ye retain, they are retained.

What do you believe according to these words? I believe that, when the called ministers of Christ deal with us by His divine command, especially when they exclude manifest and impenitent sinners from the Christian congregation, and, again, when they absolve those who repent of their sins and are willing to amend, this is as valid and certain, in heaven also, as if Christ, our dear Lord, dealt with us Himself.

The forgiveness granted in absolution is not received mechanically, but is conditioned on the repentance of the individual penitent:

289. Do hypocrites, that is, people who with their lips confess their sins, but are impenitent at heart, receive the forgiveness of sins? Hypocrites do not receive the forgiveness; for they do not accept the grace of God that is offered to them in the absolution.

The most curious part of this pastoral absolution, as I see it here, is that it is not mandatory:

292. Must a Christian privately confess his sins before the pastor? A Christian should not be forced to make a private confession before the pastor.

294. What benefit do we derive from making such private confession? When we confess our sins to our pastor and ask for forgiveness (absolution) of such sins as especially burden our conscience, we receive the comforting assurance that these sins are forgiven

The question that is not answered here is "What is my state, and the state of my sins, if I choose not to confess them to the pastor?" Evidently I will need to consult a more comprehensive Lutheran work if I am to discover the answer to that question.

Below is an excerpt from Norman Geisler's Chosen but Free, second edition, pages 20 through 21, under the heading "WHO MADE THE DEVIL DO IT?" Following the excerpt is my analysis.

For the strong (extreme) Calvinists the ultimate question is: Who made the devil do it? Or, more precisely, who caused Lucifer to sin? If free choice is doing what one desires, and if all desires come from God, then it follows logically that God made Lucifer sin against God! But it is contradictory to say that God ever could be against God. God is essentially good. He cannot sin (Heb. 6.18). In fact, He cannot even look with approval on sin. Habakkuk said to God: "Your eyes are too pure to look on evil; you cannot tolerate wrong" (1:13). James reminds us that "When tempted, no one should say, 'God is tempting me.' For God cannot be tempted by evil, nor does he tempt anyone" (1:13).

So, if for no other reason, the strong Calvinist's position must be rejected because it is contradictory. And the Bible exhorts us to "avoid contradictions" (1 Tim. 6.20 NKJV). Opposites cannot both be true at the same time and in the same sense. God cannot be good and not good. He cannot be for His own essential good and be against it by giving Lucifer the desire to sin against Him. In short, God cannot be for Himself and against Himself at the same time and in the same sense.

Consequently, some less strong Calvinists claim that God does not give any evil desires but only good ones. However, this view has two problems. First, why would God give a desire to do good only to some and not to all? If He is all-loving, then surely He would love all, as the Bible says He does (John 3:16; 1 Tim. 2:4; 2 Peter 3:9). Second, this does not explain where Lucifer got the desire to sin. If it did not come from God, then it must have come from himself. But in that case, his original evil act was self-caused, that is, caused by himself--which is exactly the view of human free will the strong Calvinist rejects.

The argument of the first two paragraphs is essentially this:

• If "free" choice is (simply) doing what one desires, and all desires come from God, then God made Lucifer sin against God.
• If God made Lucifer sin against God, then God is against himself.
• God is not against himself.
• Therefore, either it is not the case that "free" choice is simply doing what one desires, or it is not the case that all desires come from God.

So, in other words, if we accept those two tenets of "strong" Calvinism, it logically follows that God made Lucifer sin against God, and thus God works against himself.

I think the first conditional here is a strong one. If God gave his greatest angel the desire to do evil, and that angel could do nothing but follow that desire, then God made Lucifer sin. God may not have directly performed the act, but he is responsible for it. This is like a person who murders another person with a gun: the gun fired the bullet, but the bearer of the weapon is responsible because he pressed the trigger, knowing the gun could only do what it was mechanically designed to do.

The second conditional also seems sound. However, it is not immune from discussion. Someone could, for example, argue that although God did make Lucifer sin against himself, he did it, not to work against himself, but perhaps to highlight his own holiness, or perhaps simply for his own amusement.

There are two problems with this though: for one, it raises serious questions about God's morality, for he is still an instigator of evil ("worker of iniquity") which is quite the opposite of "holy". Also, it does not answer the argument, for God is, on a fundamental level, still actively undermining his own rule over the cosmos.

Evidently, Geisler did not want to be charged with presenting a straw man argument, and so he presents an alternative, held by some Calvinists, which is that God is the source of good desires but not evil desires. Geisler provides two response. First, he indicates that such a position is inconsistent with God's love, using this line of argument:

• If free choice is doing what one desires, and only good desires come from God, and God does not give good desires to everyone, then God is not all-loving.
• God is all-loving.
• Therefore, either free choice is not doing what one desires, or it is not the cause the only good desires come from God, or it is not the case that God does not give good desires to everyone.

While I am inclined to accept this argument, I think that supporting and defending it is hardly something that can be done in a single paragraph. I have met some Calvinists who have denied the concept of an all-loving God, asserting that it is an invention of the a liberal mind, and that the arbitrary, selective nature of God's love (and hate) is simply another part of God's character which we must learn to accept.

However, his second response is more fitting to the context of the discussion. He asserts that the "good desires only" position is inconsistent with its own system. His argument is like so:

• If "free" choice is simply doing what one desires, and only good desires come from God, and God does not give good desires to everyone, then Lucifer's desire for sin did not come from God.
• If Lucifer's desire for sin did not come from God, then it came from Lucifer himself.
• If Lucifer's desire for sin came from Lucifer himself, then Lucifer's evil act was self-caused.

And this means that such a Calvinist implicitly contradicts his own system, for a fundamental tenet of this system is that a self-caused act is impossible.