Geisler - Implications of Strong Calvinism for God and Lucifer

Below is an excerpt from Norman Geisler's Chosen but Free, second edition, pages 20 through 21, under the heading "WHO MADE THE DEVIL DO IT?" Following the excerpt is my analysis.

For the strong (extreme) Calvinists the ultimate question is: Who made the devil do it? Or, more precisely, who caused Lucifer to sin? If free choice is doing what one desires, and if all desires come from God, then it follows logically that God made Lucifer sin against God! But it is contradictory to say that God ever could be against God. God is essentially good. He cannot sin (Heb. 6.18). In fact, He cannot even look with approval on sin. Habakkuk said to God: "Your eyes are too pure to look on evil; you cannot tolerate wrong" (1:13). James reminds us that "When tempted, no one should say, 'God is tempting me.' For God cannot be tempted by evil, nor does he tempt anyone" (1:13).

So, if for no other reason, the strong Calvinist's position must be rejected because it is contradictory. And the Bible exhorts us to "avoid contradictions" (1 Tim. 6.20 NKJV). Opposites cannot both be true at the same time and in the same sense. God cannot be good and not good. He cannot be for His own essential good and be against it by giving Lucifer the desire to sin against Him. In short, God cannot be for Himself and against Himself at the same time and in the same sense.

Consequently, some less strong Calvinists claim that God does not give any evil desires but only good ones. However, this view has two problems. First, why would God give a desire to do good only to some and not to all? If He is all-loving, then surely He would love all, as the Bible says He does (John 3:16; 1 Tim. 2:4; 2 Peter 3:9). Second, this does not explain where Lucifer got the desire to sin. If it did not come from God, then it must have come from himself. But in that case, his original evil act was self-caused, that is, caused by himself--which is exactly the view of human free will the strong Calvinist rejects.

The argument of the first two paragraphs is essentially this:

• If "free" choice is (simply) doing what one desires, and all desires come from God, then God made Lucifer sin against God.
• If God made Lucifer sin against God, then God is against himself.
• God is not against himself.
• Therefore, either it is not the case that "free" choice is simply doing what one desires, or it is not the case that all desires come from God.

So, in other words, if we accept those two tenets of "strong" Calvinism, it logically follows that God made Lucifer sin against God, and thus God works against himself.

I think the first conditional here is a strong one. If God gave his greatest angel the desire to do evil, and that angel could do nothing but follow that desire, then God made Lucifer sin. God may not have directly performed the act, but he is responsible for it. This is like a person who murders another person with a gun: the gun fired the bullet, but the bearer of the weapon is responsible because he pressed the trigger, knowing the gun could only do what it was mechanically designed to do.

The second conditional also seems sound. However, it is not immune from discussion. Someone could, for example, argue that although God did make Lucifer sin against himself, he did it, not to work against himself, but perhaps to highlight his own holiness, or perhaps simply for his own amusement.

There are two problems with this though: for one, it raises serious questions about God's morality, for he is still an instigator of evil ("worker of iniquity") which is quite the opposite of "holy". Also, it does not answer the argument, for God is, on a fundamental level, still actively undermining his own rule over the cosmos.

Evidently, Geisler did not want to be charged with presenting a straw man argument, and so he presents an alternative, held by some Calvinists, which is that God is the source of good desires but not evil desires. Geisler provides two response. First, he indicates that such a position is inconsistent with God's love, using this line of argument:

• If free choice is doing what one desires, and only good desires come from God, and God does not give good desires to everyone, then God is not all-loving.
• God is all-loving.
• Therefore, either free choice is not doing what one desires, or it is not the cause the only good desires come from God, or it is not the case that God does not give good desires to everyone.

While I am inclined to accept this argument, I think that supporting and defending it is hardly something that can be done in a single paragraph. I have met some Calvinists who have denied the concept of an all-loving God, asserting that it is an invention of the a liberal mind, and that the arbitrary, selective nature of God's love (and hate) is simply another part of God's character which we must learn to accept.

However, his second response is more fitting to the context of the discussion. He asserts that the "good desires only" position is inconsistent with its own system. His argument is like so:

• If "free" choice is simply doing what one desires, and only good desires come from God, and God does not give good desires to everyone, then Lucifer's desire for sin did not come from God.
• If Lucifer's desire for sin did not come from God, then it came from Lucifer himself.
• If Lucifer's desire for sin came from Lucifer himself, then Lucifer's evil act was self-caused.

And this means that such a Calvinist implicitly contradicts his own system, for a fundamental tenet of this system is that a self-caused act is impossible.